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Abstract
The assumption that trade-offs exist is fundamental in evolutionary theory. Levins
(Am. Nat. 96 (1962), 361-373) introduced a widely adopted graphical method for an-
alyzing evolution towards an optimal combination of two quantitative traits, which
are traded off. His approach explicitly excluded the possibility of density-dependent
and frequency-dependent selection. Here we extend Levins method towards models,
which include these selection regimes and where therefore fitness landscapes change
with population state. We employ the same kind of curves Levins used: trade-off
curves and fitness contours. However, fitness contours are not fixed but a function
of the resident traits and we only consider those that divide the trait space into
potentially successful mutants and mutants which are not able to invade (‘invasion
boundaries’). The developed approach allows to make a priori predictions about
evolutionary endpoints and about their bifurcations. This is illustrated by applying
Preprint submitted to Theoretical Population Biology 9 March 2004
the approach to several examples from the recent literature.
Key words: adaptive dynamics, fitness landscape, frequency-dependent selection,
invasion fitness, life-history evolution, trade-off
1 Introduction
The notion of trade-offs is central to evolutionary theory. Without constraints,
organisms would evolve to become masters of all traits. As they do not, organ-
isms must have a limited set of possible phenotypes (Maynard Smith, 1978). At
the boundary of this set organisms face a trade-off: they can only improve one
trait at the expense of the others. There exists a long literature that tells how,
given such boundary constraints and given that evolution maximizes some op-
timization criterion, we can calculate the phenotypes that we should expect to
evolve (e.g. Maynard Smith, 1978; Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Lessells, 1991;
Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992; Alexander, 1996; McNamara et al., 2001).
Related to optimality models is the notion of fitness landscape or adaptive
landscape, originally introduced in the context of population genetics (Wright,
1931; Lande, 1976). In phenotypic evolution a fitness landscape is the visualiza-
tion of the function which assigns to every point in trait space the correspond-
ing value of the optimization criterion. If the trait space is two-dimensional,
this can indeed be seen as a topographical map. On the assumption that the
genetic variation is relatively small, traits in such a landscape move uphill in
the course of evolution. Evolution stops when the trait of a population has
∗ Corresponding Author.
Email address: rueffler@rulsfb.leidenuniv.nl (C. Rueﬄer).
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either reached a hilltop or a maximum at the boundary of the, constrained,
trait space (for an example where such a landscape is calculated see Benkman
(1993)).
Levins (1962; 1968) introduced an influential graphical method for finding the
optimal strategy if reproduction takes place in two different environments (Fig.
1). The two dimensions of his trait space are the average number of offspring
a given phenotype produces in each type of environment. Levins called the
set of feasible combinations ‘fitness set’. Two ingredients are important in
his approach. The first one is the trade-off curve which describes the relation
between the reproductive abilities in the two environments. It constitutes a
boundary of the trait space. The second one are the contours of the fitness
landscape which consist of all points in trait space that yield equal fitness.
When these two types of curves are plotted on top of each other the optimal
phenotype can be read from this plot. It is the strategy in the fitness set that
lies on the highest contour.
This approach appears particularly successful in life-history theory, where it
has been applied to the evolution of reproductive effort and the evolution
of iteroparity versus semelparity (e.g Pianka and Parker, 1975; Bell, 1980;
Takada, 1995) and has found its way into textbooks (Yodzis, 1989, p. 324;
Roff, 1992, p.71; 2002, p.197). If fitness contours are linear the general result
is as follows: for concave trade-offs an intermediate strategy will be optimal
(Fig. 1a), while for convex trade-offs one of the two boundary strategies will
be optimal (Fig. 1b).
In life history theory it is traditionally assumed that neither density-dependence
nor frequency-dependence influences the process of selection, leading to the
3
intrinsic rate of increase r as the natural optimization criterion (Stearns, 1992;
Roff, 1992; Charlesworth, 1994). Studies including density-dependence mostly
used either the expected lifetime reproductive success R0 or population size at
equilibrium Nˆ as the optimization criteria (e.g. Michod, 1979; Charnov, 1993;
Charlesworth, 1994). A large part of life history theory has been developed in
this way (Roff, 1992, 2002; Stearns, 1992) and has also been corroborated in
many aspects by empirical findings (Stearns, 2000).
However, there are two reasons why the optimization approach is not generally
applicable. First, there are density-dependent scenarios where no optimization
criterion mentioned so far works properly and where other functions must be
maximized (Mylius and Diekmann, 1995; Metz et al., 1996b). If the proper
criterion is not known, optimization tends to fail. Second, optimization is gen-
erally impossible in the presence of frequency-dependence (Fisher, 1930). The
study of frequency-dependent evolution made its first big step in behavioral
ecology with the introduction of game theory and the ESS-concept (Hamilton,
1967; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982; for a review see
Vincent and Brown, 1988). There is now also a growing body of literature
emphasizing the potential importance of frequency-dependent selection out-
side the realm of individual behavior (Kawecki, 1993; Day and Taylor, 1996;
Svensson and Sheldon, 1998). Frequency-dependent selection can have as a
consequence that evolution leads towards fitness minima (Christiansen, 1991;
Abrams et al., 1993) or that fitness maxima are not approached (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1990; Nowak, 1990). These aspects emerge in a natural way if
evolutionary trait substitution sequences are derived from population dynam-
ics. This is done in the theory of adaptive dynamics (Metz et al., 1992, 1996a;
Dieckmann and Law, 1996; Geritz et al., 1997, 1998), which may be defined
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as the study of mutation limited trait substitution processes through repeated
invasions of mutants in fitness landscapes that keep changing as a result of
those very substitutions. The correctness of any optimization criterion has to
be proven with respect to the population ecology where it is applied.
The aim of this paper is to extend Levins’ graphical approach for the clas-
sification of optimal strategies in a systematic way to models which explic-
itly account for any type of population regulation and therefore any type of
density-dependence and frequency-dependence. This classification allows for
a priori predictions of the evolutionary end points based on the same types
of curves Levins used: trade-off curves and fitness contours. However, fitness
contours now do not represent strategies with the same value of an a priori
chosen optimization criterion but strategies sharing the same invasion fitness
for a given resident population. Invasion fitness is the growth rate of an ini-
tially rare mutant in a resident population which is at its ecological equilibrium
(Fisher, 1930; Reed and Stenseth, 1984; Metz et al., 1992). In the presence
of frequency-dependence the fitness landscape is not fixed but depends on
the resident types. We not only determine whether a pure or an intermediate
strategy is the optimal one but also classify the dynamics of the evolutionary
process, i.e., whether such a strategy is approached. Special attention will be
given to the scenario of evolutionary branching where an originally monomor-
phic population turns dimorphic because of disruptive selection generated by
frequency-dependent interactions.
In the study of evolution invasion and Levins’ fitness set approach have been
brought together in earlier work. However, this has never been developed sys-
tematically and in a fully dynamical sense. Lawlor and Maynard Smith (1976)
employed the combination in a study on coevolution of competing species.
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Charnov used fitness sets extensively when he developed his theory of sex
allocation (Charnov et al., 1976; Charnov, 1982). Sex allocation theory is
maybe the field where the signature of frequency-dependence was recognized
first (Fisher, 1930). The fitness landscape that a mutant type with a certain
sex ratio experiences, necessarily depends on the sex ratio of the resident type.
Gatto (1993) and Ferrie`re and Gatto (1995) linked the two concepts when they
investigated which type of population dynamics one can expect to evolve in
a simple Ricker model. Another specific example of the approach we develop
systematically in this paper can be found in the appendix of de Mazancourt
et al. (2001).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the concept of
invasion fitness and in Section 3 we show how the application of this fitness
concept makes fitness landscapes change. After that we develop a complete
classification of the possible dynamical behavior of evolution as a function
of the curvature of the trade-offs and the curvature of the changing fitness
contours. Monomorphic populations are treated in Section 4. In Section 5 we
extend the results to polymorphic populations. In Section 6 we demonstrate
how the developed approach can be applied. We discuss which evolutionary
predictions can be derived a priori for qualitatively different curvature com-
binations of trade-offs and fitness contours and how changes in curvature can
alter evolutionary outcomes. We apply these ideas to several models from the
recent literature.
6
2 Invasion Fitness
The evolutionary success of a mutant depends on whether or not this initially
rare type can spread in a given resident population. Evolutionary success is
measured in terms of invasion fitness s(θm, Eθr), i.e., the long term average
growth per capita and per time unit of an initially rare mutant with trait
vector θm in an environment Eθr shaped by the resident type θr (Metz et al.,
1992). If the resident population consists of more than one type we call it a
coalition Θr = (θ1, . . . , θn) (Brown and Vincent, 1987a,b). Invasion fitness of
a mutant in a resident coalition is then given by s(θm, EΘr). The condition of
the environment EΘr is thereby considered as a function of a population dy-
namical attractor of the resident types, here assumed to be unique. Note that
we do not restrict ourselves to point attractors. It is this attractor that shapes
the environment a mutant experiences. For this to hold, we have to make two
assumptions (Metz et al., 1992, 1996a). First, there are no long lasting-trends
in those environmental components that are not influenced by the resident
population. Second, the resident population dynamics has reached its attrac-
tor before a new mutant type arrives, i.e., the ecological and evolutionary
timescales are separated. Under these conditions we can, with a slight abuse
of notation, write s directly as a function of the trait values of the mutant
and of the resident population: s(θm,Θr). For all types θi ∈ Θr of a coalition
necessarily
s(θi,Θr) = 0. (1)
If s(θm,Θr) > 0 invasion of the mutant is possible and if s(θm,Θr) < 0 the
mutant will disappear. If s(θm,Θr) = 0, the mutant is initially neutral with
respect to the resident population. Note that our formulation holds for contin-
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uous time measures of fitness. In a discrete time framework, fitness is measured
per time step and 0 has to be replaced with 1.
Whenever invasion occurs we assume that the mutant replaces its progenitor.
Sufficient conditions for this to hold are that phenotypic effects of mutations
are small and that the evolutionary dynamics are not close to a point where
the gradient of invasion fitness (see Eq. (3) below) equals zero (Geritz et al.,
2002).
3 Changing Fitness Landscapes
The next step is to link invasion fitness with fitness landscapes a` la Levins. To
this end we first briefly review some notions corresponding to changing fitness
landscapes.
When we employ invasion fitness there is no fixed fitness value attached to
a type any longer, but every mutant type has an invasion fitness conditional
on the resident population. Therefore we do not get a single fitness landscape
but as many as there are possible resident populations. For every resident
population, the landscape is divided into two parts: (1) a region of types
which have invasion fitness larger than zero and are therefore able to invade
and (2) a region of types which have invasion fitness smaller than zero and are
not able to invade. If the trait space is two-dimensional, one can visualize it
as a landscape with a region above sea level and a region below sea level. The
shoreline in this landscape is made up of all those mutant strategies which are
selectively neutral: they would neither grow nor decline in numbers under the
conditions set by the resident population. We will refer to this contour line as
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the ‘invasion boundary’. It is given implicitly by
s((t1, . . . , tn),Θr) = 0 (2)
where the t’s are the separate traits making up the n-dimensional trait vector
θm. If n = 2 Eq. (2) defines a curve and if n = 3 Eq. (2) defines a two-
dimensional manifold, etc. Since for all resident types θr ∈ Θr in a coalition
Eq. (2) applies, these types all lie on the invasion boundary generated by that
coalition.
A successful mutant either replaces one or more types already present in the
population, or the number of types coexisting will increase by one. After the
coalition has settled on a new population dynamical attractor, Eq. (1) holds
for the new set of residents. Each such event corresponds to a step in trait
space away from the seashore in an upward direction. However, each time
the seashore changes such that all types of the new coalition reside again on
the shoreline (Marrow et al., 1992). If one assumes that mutational steps are
small, then a sequence of successful invasions gradually changes the fitness
landscape.
Hilltops, bottoms of troughs and saddles are points of special interest in a
fitness landscape. Resident strategies that sit on one of these special points
of the landscape generated by themselves are called ‘evolutionarily singular
strategies’ θ∗r (Metz et al., 1996a; Geritz et al., 1998). These are points where
directional selection ceases to act. Mathematically this condition corresponds
to a zero fitness gradient,
∂s(θm,Θ
∗
r)
∂θm
∣∣∣∣∣
θm=θ∗j
= 0 for all θ∗j ∈ Θ
∗
r, (3)
which has the same dimension as the trait vector. If this condition holds
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for all members of a resident community, then this community is called an
‘evolutionarily singular coalition’ (Metz et al., 1996a; Geritz et al., 1998).
Singular strategies in one-dimensional trait spaces can be classified accord-
ing to two properties: convergence stability and noninvadability (Metz et al.,
1996a; Geritz et al., 1997, 1998). The first property means that a singular
strategy is approached in the course of evolution from within a certain neigh-
borhood (Eshel and Motro, 1981; Eshel, 1983; Christiansen, 1991). A singular
strategy not convergence stable is repelling. A strategy is (locally) noninvad-
able if no (nearby) mutant can increase in frequency when the singular strategy
is the resident type. This property corresponds to the ESS condition of game
theory (Maynard Smith, 1982). Since these two properties are mutually inde-
pendent (Eshel, 1983; Taylor, 1989; Nowak, 1990; Christiansen, 1991; Abrams
et al., 1993) four different types of evolutionarily singular strategies exist:
Continuously stable strategies (CSSs) (Eshel and Motro, 1981; Eshel,
1983; Christiansen, 1991) are both convergence stable and noninvadable.
They are end points of the evolutionary dynamics.
Branching Points (Metz et al., 1996a; Geritz et al., 1997, 1998) are conver-
gence stable and invadable. Directional selection drives a population towards
such a point. Once it is reached selection becomes disruptive. Any surround-
ing strategy can invade and coexist with the resident type in a protected
polymorphism. The number of resident strategies therefore usually increases
by one.
Garden of Eden Points (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1990; Nowak, 1990) are
strategies which are noninvadable but are never approached in the course
of evolution. If a Garden of Eden point happens to be the resident strategy,
selection is stabilizing. However, any perturbation will lead to directional
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selection away from it.
Repellors are not convergence stable and can be invaded by any surrounding
strategy.
In one-dimensional trait spaces a singular point generically corresponds to
either a hilltop or to a bottom of a trough. When trait spaces have more
dimensions, also saddle points become possible which follow the above clas-
sification only in certain directions. Furthermore, not only selection but also
the mutational process influences the direction of evolutionary change and the
notion of convergence stability becomes more complex (Motro, 1994; Matessi
and Di Pasquale, 1996; Leimar, 2001).
Under certain conditions an optimization approach yields the same results as
the more general approach of an invasion analysis. The conditions for the ex-
istence of a function which gets maximized in the process of evolution were
worked out by Mylius and Diekmann (1995) and Metz et al. (1996b). If an
optimization criterion exists, two properties hold: (1) The population stays
monomorphic. For any set of types, the type with the highest value of the
optimization criterion will displace all the others, making a polymorphism
impossible. (2) Invasion boundaries coincide with the contour curves of the
optimization criterion. An invasion boundary corresponding to a certain resi-
dent strategy consists of all strategies which are selectively neutral. These are
exactly those strategies which have the same value of the optimization crite-
rion as the given resident strategy. Only in this case the fitness landscape can
be visualized as a fixed landmass surrounded by a rising sea, with the resident
type always positioned on the shoreline of the sea.
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4 The Fitness Landscape Plot
On our way to link Levins’ fitness set to the ideas of the previous section,
we will develop our graphical approach in detail for two positive traits φ and
ψ and monomorphic populations. From now on we will assume that invasion
fitness is an increasing function of both these mutant traits. The feasibility set
is limited by the two axes and a trade-off curve. According to the traditional
mathematical notation a concave trade-off curve is characterized by a negative
second derivative (Fig. 1a). We call such a trade-off weak. It gives rise to a
convex feasibility set. A convex or strong trade-off is characterized by a positive
second derivative and gives rise to a concave feasibility set (Fig. 1b).
Since fitness is increasing in both traits, the trait vector of a population will
in general stay close to the trade-off curve. If an invasion boundary intersects
with the trade-off curve then there also exist strategies inside the feasibility
set which are able to invade. However, when mutational steps are small, steps
in the direction of the trade-off curve will dominate and the traits will stay
close to the boundary. We will idealize this with the simplifying assumption
that, after approaching it, evolution further proceeds along the trade-off curve.
Thus an increase in one trait is only possible at the expense of an immediate
decrease in the other one.
The trade-off curve is a one-dimensional manifold with boundary, which we
can parameterize with a single variable θ ∈ [0, 1]. Every value of θ represents
a point (φ, ψ) in trait space lying on the trade-off curve. We parameterize the
trade-off curve corresponding to the direction of reading, from the top left to
the bottom right. The point θ = 0 then corresponds to the minimum of φ
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and to the maximum of ψ while θ = 1 corresponds to the maximum of φ and
the minimum of ψ (Fig. 2). With this convention, strategies corresponding
to smaller θ-values than a given strategy lie above and to the left of it. Bi-
ologically, θ might have the interpretation of effort invested in one biological
function and thereby not invested in the other function. For later usage we
introduce another convention already here. An invasion boundary is said to
intersect with the trade-off curve from the inside of the feasibility set if the
invasion boundary for low values of φ lies inside the feasibility set and inter-
sects with the trade-off curve as φ increases. An invasion boundary is said to
intersect from the outside if the opposite holds true.
If an optimization criterion exists, the dynamics of the evolutionary process
can be viewed as hill climbing on a fixed landscape. This scenario corresponds
to the theory developed by Levins (1962, 1968) and we describe it here first.
Evolution proceeds along the trade-off curve until a strategy corresponding to
a (local) fitness maximum is reached. This evolutionary end point is a CSS.
No strategy on a higher contour can be reached. If contours are linear and
the trade-off curve concave, the CSS is either an intermediate strategy (Fig.
1a) or one of the boundary strategies. The first holds true when there is a
point on the trade-off curve where a contour line is a tangent to the trade-
off curve. If the trade-off curve is convex, either both boundary strategies or
only one of them are CSSs (Levins, 1962) (Fig. 1b). Again, the first applies
when there exists a θ where the contour is a tangent of the trade-off curve.
This point corresponds to a Repellor. In general, one of the two boundary
strategies will have a higher fitness value than the other. However, depending
on the starting condition and the occurring mutations, that strategy may
not be attainable. When the trade-off curve has concave and convex parts,
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combinations of intermediate and boundary CSSs can occur (Schaffer, 1974).
If contour lines are not linear other results are also possible (Levins, 1962).
The more general case is that the fitness landscape depends on the resident
strategy. The invasion boundary corresponding to a specific resident strategy
determines which mutants are able to invade and which ones are not. Once the
trade-off curve is reached, the direction of further trait substitutions depends
on the way the invasion boundaries intersect with the trade-off curve (see Fig.
2 & 3). If they intersect from the outside of the feasibility set, mutants with a
larger θ (i.e., with a trait combination on the trade-off curve below the resident
strategy) are able to invade. If it intersects from the inside of the feasibility
set, mutants with a smaller θ are able to invade. This process continues un-
til the invasion boundary becomes tangent to the trade-off curve or until the
border of the trait space is attained. In the first case an evolutionarily singu-
lar strategy is reached. The classification from Section 3 can now be made in
terms of the behavior of the invasion boundaries. Whether a singular strategy
is noninvadable or not, depends on whether the corresponding fitness contour
is locally outside or inside the feasibility set near the point of tangency. In the
first case the resident strategy is a fitness maximum and therefore noninvad-
able, in the second case the strategy is a minimum and invadable. Whether
a singular strategy is convergence stable or not, depends on the behavior of
the invasion boundaries attached to the surrounding strategies on the trade-
off curve. An evolutionarily singular strategy is convergence stable if invasion
boundaries for nearby resident strategies intersect with the trade-off curve in
such a way that strategies closer to the evolutionarily singular strategy can
invade (Fig. 2a, b & 3a, b, c, d). This is the case if invasion boundaries cor-
responding to strategies with a smaller θ than the singular strategy intersect
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with the trade-off curve from the outside. The opposite has to hold for strate-
gies with a larger θ than the singular strategy. The reverse pattern means that
a strategy is repelling (Fig. 2c, d & 3e, f, g, h).
Since the above-mentioned properties are mutually independent we can en-
counter all four different combinations. First we consider the simplest case
where invasion boundaries are linear, a condition commonly encountered in
models from the literature. Later on we treat the more general case where no
restrictions are put on the curvature of the invasion boundaries. If the trade-
off curve is concave, any tangent invasion boundary lies outside the feasibility
set, of course with the exception of the point of tangency. Hence, any singu-
lar strategy has to be either a CSS (Fig. 2a) or a Garden of Eden (Fig. 2c).
Vice versa, if the trade-off curve is convex, any tangent invasion boundary
lies inside the feasibility set. A singular strategy therefore has to be either a
Branching Point (Fig. 2b) or a Repellor (Fig. 2d).
For curved invasion boundaries any type of singular strategy can occur on
concave trade-offs as well as on convex trade-offs. If the curvature of either
the trade-off curve or of the invasion boundary changes over trait space, our
classification holds only locally.
CSS The invasion boundary is tangent to the trade-off curve from the outside
of the feasibility set. Invasion boundaries attached to points above the sin-
gular strategy intersect from the outside with the trade-off curve and from
the inside below the singular strategy. If the trade-off curve is concave, in-
vasion boundaries have to be less concave (Fig. 3a). If the trade-off curve is
convex, invasion boundaries have to be more convex (Fig. 3b).
Branching point The invasion boundary is tangent to the trade-off curve
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from the inside of the feasibility set. Invasion boundaries attached to points
above the singular strategy intersect from the outside with the trade-off
curve and vice versa below the singular strategy. If the trade-off curve is
concave, invasion boundaries have to be more concave (Fig. 3c). If the trade-
off curve is convex, invasion boundaries have to be less convex (Fig. 3d).
Garden of Eden Points The invasion boundary is tangent to the trade-off
curve from the outside of the feasibility set. Invasion boundaries attached to
points above the strategy intersect from the inside with the trade-off curve
and from the outside below the strategy. If the trade-off curve is concave,
invasion boundaries have to be less concave (Fig. 3e). If the trade-off curve
is convex, invasion boundaries have to be more convex (Fig. 3f).
Repellor The invasion boundary is tangent to the trade-off curve from the
inside of the feasibility set. Invasion boundaries attached to points above
the singular strategy intersect from the inside with the trade-off curve and
from the outside below the singular strategy. If the trade-off curve is concave,
invasion boundaries have to be more concave (Fig. 3g). If the trade-off curve
is convex, invasion boundaries have to be less convex (Fig. 3h).
The different properties of strategies that lie on the trade-off curve can also
be expressed in terms of the derivatives of the invasion boundaries and the
trade-off curve at the points where they intersect. For a strategy being a
singular point the first derivative of the two curves have to be equal. Whether
or not such a strategy is invadable depends on the relative curvature, i.e., the
difference in curvature between the two curves. This can be determined by
means of the second derivatives, which is worked out in detail in the appendix.
We now have a full classification of evolutionary singular points with respect to
the curvature of the trade-off curve and the shape of the invasion boundaries
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of the fitness landscape. On the assumption that standing genetic variation
is negligible, such a graphical classification is usually done in terms of so-
called pairwise invasibility plots (PIPs) (Metz et al., 1996a; Dieckmann, 1997;
Geritz et al., 1997, 1998). Introduced by Christiansen (1980), Motro (1982),
Matsuda (1985) and van Tienderen and de Jong (1986), they now are used
widely to visualize evolutionary dynamics (e.g. Claessen and Dieckmann, 2002;
Day et al., 2002; Egas et al., in press). Their strength is that they allow
for an easy graphical analysis of evolutionary dynamics in one-dimensional
trait spaces and for monomorphic populations. However, the predictions of
evolutionary dynamics which are possible with the fitness landscape plot (see
Section 6) cannot be extracted from PIPs. While a PIP is simply a contour plot
of invasion fitness, the fitness landscape plot allows us to derive evolutionary
dynamics from more mechanistic arguments. Since it is based on the shape
of the trade-off curve and the invasion boundaries, we can assess how the
evolutionary dynamics changes when their curvatures are altered. The PIP
shows invasion fitness only for resident and mutant strategies lying on the
trade-off curve, i.e., for the strategies which we parameterized by θ. In Fig. 4
we illustrate the relation between a fitness landscape plot and a PIP.
5 Polymorphic Evolution of a One-Dimensional Trait
Once a population has reached a Branching Point, selection becomes disruptive
and a formerly monomorphic population turns dimorphic (Metz et al., 1996a;
Geritz et al., 1998). From then on, we have to follow the evolution of two
resident types θ1 and θ2. Because of Eq. (1), both resident types must lie on
the same invasion boundary. Further evolutionary dynamics can be read from
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a fitness landscape plot in the same way as was done from Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
The population has reached an evolutionarily singular coalition (θ∗1, θ
∗
2) when
∂s(θm, (θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2))
∂θm
∣∣∣∣
θm=θ∗j
= 0 for j ∈ {1, 2}. (4)
At an evolutionarily singular coalition, the invasion boundary has to be tan-
gent to the trade-off curve at both resident strategies. Further branching can
occur if the invasion boundary is tangent to the trade-off curve from the in-
side of the feasibility set for one of the two resident types at least. Eq. (4)
immediately generalizes to evolutionarily singular coalitions with an arbitrary
number of resident types.
Under certain conditions the course of the polymorphic evolution can be de-
rived from geometrical arguments, for instance when the invasion boundaries
for populations consisting of two resident types are linear. Such an invasion
boundary always intersects with the trade-off curve in the two points corre-
sponding to the two resident types. If the trade-off curve is convex, the traits
in the singular coalition are either driven apart until the boundary of the
trait space is reached (Fig. 5) or until one of the two types goes extinct. In
the first case the end point of the evolutionary process corresponds to a pop-
ulation consisting of the two pure strategies θ∗1 = 0 and θ
∗
2 = 1. No further
branching is possible. The second case is sketched in Fig. 6, on the assumption
that the population decline is continuous. At the point where the evolution-
ary trajectory changes from dimorphic to monomorphic by the extinction of
one type, the invasion boundary intersects with the trade-off curve in such a
way, that selection favors further specialization of the remaining type (Fig. 6)
until it has reached the boundary of the trait space. Let us further assume
that the dimorphism emerged at a Branching Point, which by definition at-
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tracts monomorphic populations from both directions. Under this condition,
we can conclude that the gradual extinction of one type is only possible when
a Repellor exists between the remaining type and the Branching Point. This
Repellor separates the two basins of attraction of the monomorphic evolution,
which lead to either the Branching Point or the boundary of the trait space.
A second conclusion arising from this argument is, that evolutionary cycles
of branching and extinction as observed by Mathias and Kisdi (1999), Kisdi
et al. (2000) and Doebeli and Dieckmann (2000) are not possible.
These arguments hold also for nonlinear invasion boundaries, whenever the
invasion boundary of the dimorphic population intersects with the trade-off
curve from the inside at the upper left resident strategy and from the outside
at the lower right resident strategy. A change of such a constellation is only
possible via a phase with three points of intersection between the trade-off
curve and the invasion boundary. It is only under this condition that the
presented results may depend on the rate of evolution in the two types.
It is easy to understand that an evolutionarily singular coalition where two res-
ident types are intermediate strategies requires more complicated curvatures
than we discussed so far.
6 Curvature Combinations
Our approach elucidates the interplay between population dynamics (inva-
sion fitness) and properties of the organism (trade-off curve) in a graphical
way. In certain cases the qualitative outcome of an evolutionary model can be
predicted immediately. This is sometimes possible even for polymorphic pop-
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ulations where up to now numerical calculations needed to be employed. In
other cases it enables us to predict changes in the outcome of an evolutionary
model when parameters which influence the curvature of either the trade-off
or the invasion boundaries are altered. That means, it allows us to make state-
ments which are similar to those derived from a bifurcation analysis. In this
section we classify models with respect to the curvature of the trade-off and
the invasion boundaries into four groups and discuss which results one can
derive a priori.
Linear Trade-Off & Linear Invasion Boundaries
This is the simplest case. A trade-off curve is linear when one trait is a linear
function of the other. An example for this are seeds that can either germinate
or stay in the seed bank. The probabilities for these two alternatives have to
add up to one. Invasion boundaries are linear when invasion fitness is a linear
function of the two traits that are traded off. Sometimes this is easier to detect
when a sign-equivalent proxy for invasion fitness is used. In this scenario, an
invasion boundary either intersects with the trade-off curve or coincides with
it. The first situation corresponds to directional selection while the latter sit-
uation corresponds to a singular strategy where all mutants on the trade-off
curve are selectively neutral. This singular strategy is a mixed strategy and its
value determines the probability of each individual to exhibit either of the pure
strategies. It can be repelling or attracting. If such a strategy exists, the cor-
responding PIP shows a vertical zero contour line next to the diagonal where
the mutant and resident have equal trait values (Geritz et al., 1998; Mesze´na
et al., 2001). In this case the fitness landscape changes depending on the resi-
dent strategy and therefore frequency-dependent selection has to be involved.
However, evolutionary branching and genetically polymorphic populations are
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not possible. If no frequency-dependence is present, the evolutionary problem
can be solved by maximizing an optimization criterion (Metz et al., 1996b)
and either of the two pure strategies will be optimal. The model in Heino et al.
(1997) serves as an example for these statements. These authors investigate
the evolutionary dynamics of maturation in a semelparous organism. Each
organism matures with a certain probability and then dies, or it delays mat-
uration to the next season where it reproduces and then dies. It is assumed
that the population is in population dynamical equilibrium so that we can use
life-time offspring production R0 as a stand-in for invasion fitness. R0 equals
the sum of the reproductive output at ages one and two, weighted with their
respective probabilities. As these probabilities sum up to one, Heino et al.’s
model falls into the case where the feasibility set is given by a linear trade-off.
When only one resource is involved in the feedback environment there is no
frequency-dependence and generically either of the two pure strategies is a
CSS, resulting in an annual semelparous organism or a biennial semelparous
organism. When two resources are involved a resident strategy can exist for
which the slopes of the trade-off and the invasion boundary are equal. This
is an evolutionarily singular strategy which is convergence stable, and once it
is reached all mutants are selectively neutral. In this situation a certain frac-
tion of the population reproduces after one year while the remaining fraction
reproduces after two years.
Nonlinear Trade-Off & Linear Invasion Boundaries
Many classical life-history models (e.g Pianka and Parker, 1975; Bell, 1980;
Takada, 1995) belong to the category where the trade-off can be either convex
or concave and the invasion boundaries are linear. Only CSSs or Gardens
of Eden are possible in combination with concave trade-offs (Fig. 2a, c) while
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Branching Points and Repellors are possible in combination with convex trade-
offs (Fig. 2b, d). Whenever the trade-off switches from concave to convex
an uninvadable strategy loses this property and becomes either a Branching
Point or a Repellor. If frequency-dependence can be excluded we are back at
the classical result (Fig. 1). A recent model with a nonlinear trade-off and
linear invasion boundaries is presented in Day et al. (2002). These authors
developed a model for a simple food chain in order to study the evolutionary
implications of different complexities in the interactions between the three
different trophic levels. The evolving trait determines the trade-off between
growth and reproduction in the consumer. In their model invasion boundaries
are linear. This can be seen when calculations are done in terms of the lifetime
number of offspring, which in their model is a sign-equivalent proxy for invasion
fitness. For convex trade-off curves they either find a Repellor (Fig. 1b and
2d) or a Branching Point (Fig. 2b), depending on whether the interactions
in the food chain allow for frequency-dependent selection or not. For concave
trade-off curves they always find CSSs (Fig. 1a and Fig. 2a). Our type of
analysis (Fig. 5) makes clear that after branching the dimorphic evolution
always proceeds until a coalition of the two extreme types is reached where
one type invests all energy into reproduction and the other type invests all
energy into growth. Day et al. (2002) already surmised this result on the basis
of numerical calculations. Our approach not only provides a proof, but also
makes it easy to spot the result from the fact that the trade-off is convex and
that invasion boundaries stay linear for dimorphic populations.
Linear Trade-Off & Nonlinear Invasion Boundaries
Nonlinear invasion boundaries can occur if invasion fitness is a nonlinear func-
tion of the two traits that are traded off. In some cases invasion boundaries
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may become linear after rescaling the traits. An example where such a rescal-
ing is not possible, can be found in Ebenman et al. (1996). These authors
investigated a model for the evolution of different sensitivities to density de-
pendence using nonlinear Ricker type functions. Nonlinear invasion boundaries
also occur in models incorporating environmental fluctuations (Mathias and
Kisdi, 2002) or nonequilibrium population dynamics (Gatto, 1993). Ferrie`re
and Gatto (1995) present a theorem which states necessary conditions for
invasion boundaries to be convex in models dealing with either fluctuating
environments or nonequilibrium dynamics. This is the case when all positive
entries of the population matrices are log-concave functions of the evolving
traits. If the conditions of the theorem are fulfilled and the trade-off is either
linear or concave, Branching Points and Repellors cannot occur.
When nonlinear invasion boundaries occur together with a linear trade-off,
again only two of the four types of singular points are possible for each shape
of the invasion boundaries. An uninvadable strategy loses the ESS-property
whenever the invasion boundary attached to it switches from convex to con-
cave. Therefore a CSS and a Garden of Eden turn into either a Branching
Point or Repellor (see Fig. 3, however with linear trade-off). Mathias and
Kisdi (2002) analyzed a model with a linear trade-off and nonlinear invasion
boundaries. It is a two-patch model with environmental stochasticity for the
germination rate of plant seeds, where no analytical expression for the in-
vasion boundaries can be derived. The trade-off determines whether a seed
germinates or stays in the seed bank. Since each seed follows either of these
two strategies, the feasibility set is given by the straight line where the sum of
the two probabilities equals one. The authors perform a numerical bifurcation
analysis for the dispersal parameter between the two patches. If dispersal is
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low, evolutionary branching occurs. When dispersal increases, the Branching
Point turns into a CSS. From this we can conclude that at the bifurcation
point invasion boundaries change from concave to convex (see Fig. 3c and d
vs 3a and b).
Nonlinear Trade-Off & Nonlinear Invasion Boundaries
The most general case is where both the trade-off curve and the invasion
boundaries are nonlinear (see Fig. 3). A general prediction in this case is that
invadable singular strategies occur more easily in combination with strong
trade-offs since it is then more likely that an invasion boundary is tangent
to the trade-off curve from the inside of the feasibility set. Hence, we pre-
dict that uninvadable singular points become invadable when the trade-off is
strengthened. This prediction is confirmed in a study by Egas et al. (in press).
They study the evolution of specialization in a two-patch model, a situation
which corresponds to the models Levins used to present his original ideas.
The evolving trait is a parameter determining the efficiencies in the two dif-
ferent habitats which are traded off. Due to environmental stochasticity in
their model, it is not possible to derive an analytical expression for the in-
vasion boundaries. They find branching as well on strong and weak trade-off
curves. We can conclude that in the latter case invasion boundaries are more
strongly concave than the trade-off (Fig. 3c). Whenever they find a CSS, it
turns into a Branching Point when the strength of the trade-off is increased
sufficiently as predicted by our framework. Furthermore they report of regions
in their parameter space where evolutionary branching leads to an interior
pair of generalists indicating complexly curved invasion boundaries.
When the shape of the invasion boundaries is known to be either convex or
24
concave stronger statements can be made. As an example serves a paper by
Gatto (1993) who investigated a Ricker map with a concave trade-off between
adult survival and fecundity. In that model invasion boundaries are either lin-
ear (when the resident strategy corresponds to a stable equilibrium) or convex
(when the resident strategy corresponds to a cyclic or chaotic attractor). He
shows that whether a CSS strategy corresponds to either a stable equilibrium
or to a cyclic or chaotic attractor depends crucially on the precise extent of
the feasibility set. In the model it is obvious that a CSS corresponding to a
stable equilibrium is unique. Gatto cannot exclude the possibility that mul-
tiple CSSs are possible when they correspond to cyclic or chaotic attractors.
However, when two or more attracting singular strategies exist they have to
be separated by either a Repellor or a Garden of Eden. Since these repelling
strategies cannot occur under the given constraint that the trade-off is concave
and the invasion boundaries are convex, multiple CSSs are not possible.
7 Discussion
In this paper we extended the graphical approach of Levins (1962, 1968) for
the classification of optimal strategies to models which include any type of
density-dependence and thereby give rise to frequency-dependent selection. In
the framework Levins considered, stable fitness maxima (CSSs) and unsta-
ble fitness minima (Repellors) are the only possible types of singular strate-
gies. However, when selection is frequency-dependent unstable fitness maxima
(Branching Points) and stable fitness minima (Gardens of Eden) are also pos-
sible. We present necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of simple geo-
metrical properties for the occurrence of all different evolutionarily singular
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strategies. Furthermore we extended the approach to polymorphic populations
which consist of more than one type.
The strength of the presented approach lies in the possibility to make qual-
itative predictions about long term evolutionary dynamics using simple geo-
metrical techniques. This allows furthermore to predict how the properties of
evolutionary end points change with changes in parameters.
The conditions are derived from the same two types of curves Levins used.
(1) Trade-off curves have the same meaning as in Levins’ original approach.
They delimit the set of possible phenotypes within trait space. Their shape
is given by genetic, ontogenetic, physiological and morphological constraints
of the organism under study. Unfortunately there is no study known to us
which has revealed the details of this curvature for any life history trade-
off in a specific organism. However, these curvatures are central in life history
theory (Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992) which indicates a major gap between theory
and empirical knowledge. For morphological traits there are promising data
describing the shape of trade-off curves (Benkman, 1993; Schluter, 1993). (2)
Our approach relies only on one special contour line of the fitness landscape:
the invasion boundary. In trait space this contour separates those phenotypes
which are able to invade a given resident population from those that are not.
Invasion boundaries are fundamentally different from the contours Levins used
since they are conditional on a resident population. This reflects the fact that
under frequency-dependent selection the fitness landscape is changing with
population state. Although it should in principle be possible to determine the
curvature of an invasion boundaries empirically, we are not aware of any such
study. In the theoretical sense their curvature is the result of a specific model
formulation, i.e., it is determined by the way the trade-off enters the fitness
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function which in turn depends on how exactly each component of fitness
contributes to population growth.
Although we considered the shape of the trade-off curve and the invasion
boundaries as given properties, they can in principle change over evolution-
ary time. When we allow for flexibility in of these curves, the dimension of
the evolutionary trait space is increased. When fitness is an increasing func-
tion of both traits, directional selection will act such, that trade-offs become
weaker, i.e., more concave, since then both traits increase simultaneously in
value. As a consequence, strong trade-offs can only persist under evolutionary
constraints. Since the curvature of invasion boundaries is not a direct model
assumption but rather implicitly defined, no parameter exists which deter-
mines their curvature directly. However, these curvatures can change due to
selection on other parameters which are part of the implicit function defining
the invasion boundary. A specific example is provided by Gatto (1993). In his
model, invasion boundaries are linear when the resident type corresponds to
a equilibrium attractor and convex when the resident type corresponds to a
oscillating and chaotic attractor. Under certain conditions the former type can
get invaded by the latter type. After fixation of such a mutant, the curvature
of the invasion boundary has changed from linear to convex.
For the evolutionary dynamics it is decisive whether the way population
growth is regulated causes frequency-dependent selection. With frequency-
dependent selection, optimization tends to fail. For frequency-dependent se-
lection to occur at least two different resources which influence different age
classes or stage classes have to be involved (Heino et al., 1998). Here the word
resource has to be understood in the widest possible sense, i.e., including all
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factors involved in population regulation like for instance predators. In or-
der to find conditions conducive to frequency-dependent selection in natural
populations, empirical studies should try to pinpoint two things: (1) what
are the densities involved in density-dependent population regulation and (2)
which stage or age dependent parameters are affected. Frequency-dependent
selection can also arise from nonequilibrium population dynamics. If the pop-
ulation dynamical attractor is cyclic, quasi-cyclic, or chaotic, optimization is
often not possible, and, moreover, the number of coexisting species can exceed
the number of limiting resources (e.g. Koch, 1974; Gatto, 1993; Huisman and
Weissing, 1999). In this case the invasion success of a rare mutant depends
on the resident type and the fluctuations it creates. Stochastic environmental
fluctuations can lead to effective frequency-dependent selection in a similar
way (e.g. Levins, 1979; Kisdi and Mesze´na, 1993; McNamara, 1995).
We derived a priori predictions of the evolutionary dynamics based on the
shape of the trade-off and the invasion boundaries in the previous section. The
evolutionary dynamics are especially interesting when they allow for Branch-
ing Points where populations undergo disruptive selection and become di-
morphic. At Branching Points, biological diversity is generated (Doebeli and
Dieckmann, 2000). When evolving traits are related to the usage of different
resources, branching leads to the evolution of specialists that each rely on a
different resource. The occurrence of Branching Points is facilitated by strong
trade-offs. If the benefit from each resource is negatively frequency-dependent,
evolution will first lead towards a generalist strategy. Once the generalist has
become established, selections turns disruptive and it pays off to specialize on
a single resource. The likelihood of branching decreases if trade-offs are weak.
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In variable environments invasion fitness is given by the dominant Lyapunov
exponent (e.g. Metz et al., 1992). In the simplest case of structureless popu-
lations this reduces to the geometric mean of the annual growth rates. Since
the geometric mean is very sensitive to occasionally low values, evolution fa-
vors strategies with a low variance in the annual growth rate. A bet-hedging
generalist that relies on more than one resource will in general suffer less from
fluctuations than a specialist, which relies on a single resource (Philippi and
Seger, 1989; Wilson and Yoshimura, 1994 and references therein). Thus, we
expect that fluctuations make evolutionary branching less likely. This is in
accordance with a result of Ferrie`re and Gatto (1995), which states that en-
vironmental fluctuations usually generate convex invasion boundaries. In this
manner, environmental fluctuations will hamper the scope for branching.
The described patterns change if fitness is not an increasing function in the
two traits but decreasing in one or both traits. In that case the trade-off curve
does not get approached from the bottom left corner of the feasibility set but
from other directions. The results hold when the definition for strong and
weak trade-offs is adjusted. For instance, if fitness is a decreasing function of
two traits (e.g. mortality and sensitivity to competition) the trade-off curve
is approached from the top right corner of the trait space. A strong trade-off
now corresponds to a concave trade-off curve. In many cases, however, it will
be possible to reparameterize traits in such a way that fitness is again an
increasing function of both traits.
If the trait space has more than two dimensions, several trade-offs can be
involved. Therefore the boundary of the trait space becomes a higher dimen-
sional manifold and we have to parameterize it in more than one parameter.
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One can still consider a two-dimensional subspace to which the presented re-
sults can be applied. Generally however, the evolutionary dynamics in higher
dimensional trait spaces become less easy to classify (Motro, 1994; Matessi
and Di Pasquale, 1996; Metz et al., 1996a; Leimar, 2001) and it remains open
how the presented results can be extended using more elaborate differential
geometry. However, the intuitive idea that the relative curvature of the trade-
off manifold and the invasion manifold decide on the direction of selection,
should be correct.
Acknowledgements
CR was supported by the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research
(NWO), grant 810.34.001. TVD and JAJM were supported by the European
Training Network ModLife (Modern Life-History Theory and its Application
to the Management of Natural Resources), funded through the Human Poten-
tial Program of the European Commission (Contract HPRN-CT-2000-00051).
Comments from E. van Ast-Gray, T. Day, M. Durinx, M. Egas, R. Ferrie`re,
E´. Kisdi, F. Weissing and an anonymous referee improved the manuscript a
lot.
A Mathematical Description
We can produce the classification of Section 4 by characterizing the evolu-
tionary dynamics in terms of the first and second derivative of the trade-off
curve and the invasion boundaries. This is done for the case where the resident
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population is monomorphic. We can write the invasion fitness as
s(θm, θr) = s
(
[φ(θm), ψ(θm)] , [φ(θr), ψ(θr)]
)
, (A1)
where φ(θ) and ψ(θ) denote the coordinates in trait space of either the mutant
or the resident. In the polymorphic case we have to replace θr by θi and the
conditions have to hold for each θi ∈ Θr in order to achieve the same result
for singular coalitions.
The derivative of the trade-off curve at strategy θr is given by
µ(θr) :=
∂ψ
∂θ
∂θ
∂φ
(θr). (A2)
The invasion boundary corresponding to θr consists of all strategies (φ, ψ)
which are selectively neutral and is given by the implicit function theorem
applied to Eq. (2). Its slope at θr is
ν(θr) :=
[
−
∂s((φ, ψ), θr)
∂φ
/
∂s((φ, ψ), θr)
∂ψ
]
φ=φ(θr),ψ=ψ(θr)
. (A3)
A resident strategy θr is an evolutionary singular strategy θ
∗ if the corre-
sponding invasion boundary is tangent to the trade-off curve at this point,
i.e.
µ(θr) = ν(θr). (A4)
An evolutionarily singular strategy θ∗ is noninvadable if the invasion boundary
is tangent with the trade-off curve from the outside of the feasibility set. This is
determined by the curvature of the trade-off curve and the invasion boundary.
The curvature of a function at a point θ is given by the second derivative in
the tangential direction. However, at a singular point the trade-off curve and
the invasion boundary have the same tangent and we can simply compare the
31
second derivatives. A straight line then has zero curvature while a concave
curve has negative curvature and a convex curve positive curvature. Thus,
θ∗ is noninvadable if the curvature of the trade-off curve is smaller than the
curvature of the invasion boundary:
∂(µ− ν)
∂φ
(θ∗) < 0. (A5)
An evolutionarily singular strategy θ∗ is convergence stable if locally the cor-
responding invasion boundaries intersect with the trade-off curve from the
outside for θr < θ
∗ and from the inside for θr > θ
∗ (see Fig. 2 & 3). This
implies that the difference between the derivative of the trade-off curve and
the derivative of the invasion boundary (i.e. µ− ν) is positive for θr < θ
∗ and
negative for θr > θ
∗. This is equivalent to (µ− ν)(θ∗) = 0 and
∂(µ− ν)
∂θr
(θ∗) < 0. (A6)
The characterization of the evolutionary dynamics by these properties is given
in Table 1.
If invasion boundaries are linear the classification from Table 1 becomes sim-
pler. Since the curvature of a straight line is zero the difference in curvature
between the trade-off curve and the invasion boundaries is solely determined
by the trade-off curve. The condition for noninvadability from Eq. (A5) be-
comes
∂µ
∂φ
(θ∗) < 0. (A7)
The curvature of the trade-off curve has to be negative and therefore concave
and a singular strategy is then either a CSS or a Garden of Eden. If the trade-
off curve is convex its curvature is positive and a singular strategy can only
be a Repellor or a Branching Point.
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Table 1
Classification of the evolutionarily singular strategies θ∗ with respect to (1) the
relative curvature of the trade-off curve and the invasion boundary and (2) the
difference in slope the between trade-off curve and the invasion boundary.
Noninvadable Invadable
∂(µ−ν)
∂φ
(θ∗) < 0 ∂(µ−ν)
∂φ
(θ∗) > 0
Convergence stable
∂(µ−ν)
∂θr
(θ∗) < 0
Continuously Stable Strategy Branching Point
Repelling
∂(µ−ν)
∂θr
(θ∗) > 0
Garden of Eden Repellor
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Figure 1. Fixed fitness contour lines in a two-dimensional trait space plotted on
top of a concave (a) and a convex (b) trade-off curve. Under the assumption that
fitness is increasing in both traits, the open circles correspond to strategies that
maximize fitness. For the concave trade-off (a) this happens at the point where the
fitness contour line is tangent to the trade-off curve. For the convex trade-off (b)
this happens at either of the two boundary strategies.
Figure 2. Invasion boundaries in a two-dimensional trait space for strategies lying
one the trade-off curve (traits named φ and ψ, see text). When invasion boundaries
are linear, CSSs and Garden of Eden points are only possible in combination with
concave trade-offs (a, c), while Repellors and Branching Points can only occur on
convex trade-offs (b, d). Resident strategies are indicated by an open circle and the
arrows indicate the direction of further trait substitutions.
Figure 3. Invasion boundaries in a two-dimensional trait space for strategies lying
one the trade-off curve (traits named φ and ψ, see text). If invasion boundaries are
not bound to be linear, each of the four evolutionarily singular points can occur in
combination with both convex and concave trade-off curves.
Figure 4. Branching point in the trait θ: (a) Represented as a pairwise invasibility
plot (PIP), resident trait value at the x-axis and mutant trait value at the y-axis.
(b-d) Fitness landscape representation for three different resident strategies θr (1-3)
which lie on the trade-off curve. Resident strategies are indicated by an open circle.
Mutants which are selectively neutral and therefore lie on the invasion boundary
are indicated by a filled circle. Arrows indicate the direction of the evolutionary
dynamics along the trade-off curve. The plus sign indicates mutant strategies that
are able to invade.
Figure 5. Dimorphic evolution on a convex trade-off curve with a linear invasion
boundary. The resident types θ1 and θ2 are indicated by open circles. Arrows indicate
the direction of selection corresponding to the resident strategies.
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Figure 6. Scenario of dimorphic evolution where one resident type (θ2) goes ex-
tinct in the course of evolution (indicated by a circle with a dotted boundary) and
the other type (θ1) remains. The process is sketched when the evolutionary tra-
jectory changes from dimorphic to monomorphic. At this moment selection favors
further specialization of the remaining type (indicated by arrow). This scenario is
only possible with a Repellor (Rep) between the Branching Point (BP), where the
polymorphism emerged, and the remaining type. See text for further details.
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